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TREASURY’S INNOVATIVE USE OF FINANCIAL 
SANCTIONS 
 
ORDE F. KITTRIE* 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
From a sanctions perspective, the first decade of the 21st 
Century has been dominated by two principal factors:  a return by 
the Security Council to very near its pre-Cold War deadlock, and 
the search for a “targeted sanction” which will achieve decisive 
coercive pressure on international wrongdoers while imposing no 
or minimal collateral damage.1  While the Holy Grail of a perfect 
targeted sanction has yet to be found and may unfortunately be 
unachievable, the new century’s closest approximation of such a 
Grail is almost certainly the novel breed of financial sanctions 
designed and implemented since 2005 by the U.S. Department of 
the Treasury. 
Although this novel breed of financial sanctions was designed 
and first implemented under the administration of George W. 
Bush, the Obama Administration has already cast a vote of 
confidence in it by making the extraordinary decision to retain in 
place Stuart Levey, the Bush-appointed Under Secretary of the 
Treasury, who is principally known as the leading architect of 
these financial sanctions.  The decision to retain Levey is both a 
vote of confidence in this novel breed of financial sanctions and an 
indication that their design is likely to have a strong influence on 
 
 * Orde F. Kittrie is a Professor of Law at Arizona State University.  Prior to 
entering academia, he served for eleven years at the United States Department of 
State, including as a specialist on sanctions and on nuclear nonproliferation. 
 1 See David Cortright & George A. Lopez, Introduction: Assessing Smart 
Sanctions: Lessons from the 1990s, in SMART SANCTIONS: TARGETING ECONOMIC 
STATECRAFT 1, 2 (David Cortright & George A. Lopez eds., 2002) (describing the 
characteristics of a smart sanctions policy). 
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any Obama Administration efforts to increase the range and 
impact of sanctions on Iran or other rogue states.2 
This Article will analyze the motivation, design, 
implementation, impact, and future prospects for this new breed of 
financial sanctions.  The Article will also identify and analyze 
several innovative aspects of these sanctions that seem highly 
likely to be replicated in the design of a wide range of future 
sanctions against other targets.  The most sophisticated and 
widespread implementation of these sanctions thus far has been 
against Iran, and so it is Treasury’s use against Iran on which this 
Article will focus, while also periodically referencing their 
implementation against North Korea, their other principal target 
thus far. 
2. MOTIVATION FOR DEVELOPMENT OF INNOVATIVE FINANCIAL 
SANCTIONS 
2.1. Historical Background 
During the 1990s, the economic sanctions imposed by the 
international community reached both a peak in power and a 
trough in popularity.  The first half of that decade saw the highest 
number of worldwide sanctions episodes since World War II.3  In 
particular, the United Nations Security Council, which had 
imposed mandatory economic sanctions on only two targets 
between 1945 and 1990, imposed economic sanctions on nine target 
states and comprehensive sanctions on Iraq (1990), the former 
Yugoslavia (1992), and Haiti (1994) between 1990 and 1995. 
Two of these Security Council sanctions regimes—those on 
Libya and Iraq—addressed proliferation challenges similar to those 
posed by Iran and North Korea.  In both the Libyan and the Iraqi 
case, sanctions contributed to stopping the progress of the rogue 
state’s nuclear weapons program.4  The strong (although less-than-
 
 2 See, e.g., Paul Richter, Bush Official Involved With Iran Sanctions Stays, L.A. 
TIMES, Feb. 3, 2009, at A6 (“The Obama administration has decided to retain the 
official who led the Bush administration's effort to squeeze Iran with economic 
sanctions, providing an important clue on how it intends to approach the Islamic 
Republic.”). 
 3 GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED 18 tbl.1.1 
(3d ed. 2007). 
4 Id. at 12–13.  Readers interested in a more detailed discussion of the 
contribution of sanctions to stopping the Libyan and Iraqi nuclear weapons 
programs may wish to refer to Orde F. Kittrie, Averting Catastrophe: Why the 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss3/3
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comprehensive) sanctions imposed by the Security Council on 
Libya in 1992 and 1993 induced Libya’s government, “a regime 
that had become synonymous with international terrorism,”5 to 
forsake terrorism and completely and verifiably relinquish its 
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs.  Libya ceased 
its support for terrorism following the Security Council’s 
imposition on it of strong sanctions in 1992 and 1993.6  In exchange 
for removal of the Security Council sanctions, Libya, in August 
2003, formally accepted responsibility for the bombing of Pan Am 
Flight 103 and paid $2.7 billion in compensation.7  Furthermore, 
Libya announced on December 19, 2003 that it had decided “to get 
rid of [weapons of mass destruction (“WMD”)] materials, 
equipment and programs, and to become totally free of 
internationally banned weapons.”8  Libya proceeded to allow a 
team of British and American government experts to enter the 
country and completely dismantle Libya’s WMD infrastructure by 
April 2004.9 
In the meantime, the comprehensive sanctions on Iraq achieved 
their objective of halting Saddam Hussein’s progress toward a 
nuclear arsenal.  However, this accomplishment became clear only 
after (and was overshadowed by) the Coalition occupation of Iraq 
in 2003.  While the Iraq sanctions were in place, and since then, 
there has been a widespread perception that comprehensive 
sanctions on Iraq hurt innocent Iraqis while not commensurately 
advancing the purposes for which the sanctions had been imposed.  
This perception, combined with the impact on Security Council 
decision-making of increased U.S.-Russia tensions, has contributed 
to the Council, in the fourteen years since 1994, never again 
imposing comprehensive economic sanctions. 
The Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs are currently 
further along than the Iraqi and Libyan nuclear programs ever 
 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is Losing its Deterrence Capacity and How to Restore It, 
28 MICH J. INT’L L. 337, 400, 406 (2007), from which this discussion is adapted. 
5 Stephen D. Collins, Dissuading State Support of Terrorism: Strikes or Sanctions? 
(An Analysis of Dissuasion Measures Employed Against Libya), 27 STUD. CONFLICT & 
TERRORISM 1, 16 (2004). 
 6 Id. at 2, 5, 13–15. 
7 Felicity Barringer, Libya Admits Culpability in Crash of Pan Am Plane, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 16, 2003, at A6. 
8 Libyan Call Against Arms, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2003, at A10 (citing text of the 
Libyan government statement). 
9 Judith Miller, Gadhafi’s Leap of Faith, WALL ST. J., May 17, 2006, at A18. 
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were.  However, the sanctions imposed on Iran and North Korea 
by the international community thus far are much weaker than the 
sanctions which stopped the Iraqi and Libyan nuclear weapons 
programs.10  Indeed, both the Iran and the North Korea sanctions 
are thus far weaker than those the Security Council had previously 
imposed in response to many lesser threats to international peace 
and security.  For example, both sets of sanctions are weaker than 
those imposed on Liberia and Cote D’Ivoire during their civil wars, 
Sierra Leone in response to its May 1997 military coup, the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991–93 during the Bosnian crisis, and 
Haiti in response to its 1991 military coup.  Several factors have 
contributed to the weakness of the sanctions on Iran and North 
Korea—including a Security Council more and more deadlocked 
as a result of Russia-U.S. tensions, the dismal reputation sanctions 
acquired during their use against Iraq, and the growing 
unwillingness of the increasingly profit-oriented Russian and 
Chinese governments to sacrifice short-term profits for the long-
term benefits (such as stopping proliferation) that sanctions are 
intended to achieve.  As a result, the sanctions imposed by the 
Security Council on Iran and North Korea have been too weak to 
coerce either into giving up, or to contain either’s ability to 
advance, its nuclear program. 
Faced with the apparent impossibility of getting strong 
sanctions through the U.N. Security Council, the relatively weak 
commitment to nonproliferation sanctions of key European and 
other allied governments, and the relative paucity of trade between 
the United States and Iran (most such trade is prohibited by U.S. 
law), American opponents of Iran’s nuclear program have in recent 
years creatively used law in three key initiatives to step up the 
economic pressure on Iran.  These three initiatives are an effort to 
divest state and local government pensions from certain companies 
doing business with Iran,11 an effort to pressure companies 
 
10 Readers interested in a more detailed analysis of the U.N. Security Council 
sanctions imposed in response to the Iranian and North Korean nuclear 
programs—including comparison of those sanctions with other Security Council 
sanctions and a thorough analysis of the factors contributing to their weakness—
may wish to see Kittrie, supra note 4, at 371–91, 423–25, from which this discussion 
is adapted. 
11 See, e.g., Julie Kosterlitz, Squeezing Iran, NAT’L J., Sept. 1, 2007, at 22, 22–29 
(discussing a grassroots campaign advocating divestment of state and local 
government pensions from companies doing business with Iran). 
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supplying gasoline to Iran into halting those sales,12 and the 
Treasury Department’s new breed of financial sanctions.  Each of 
these initiatives seeks to persuade specific third-country companies 
to stop doing business with the targeted rogue state (Iran), 
including by putting those third-country companies to a choice 
between the U.S. market and that of the rogue state. 
The most sophisticated and impactful of these innovative 
sanctions initiatives has thus far been the Treasury Department’s 
deployment of financial sanctions to increase U.S. leverage over 
Iranian decision-making and to counter Iran’s use of the 
international financial system to achieve its nuclear objectives and 
finance terrorism.  While similar financial sanctions have been 
used against North Korea, their use against Iran has been more 
highly developed and wide-ranging (in part because Iran has a 
much broader and deeper set of relationships with the 
international financial system), and so it is their use against Iran on 
which this Article will focus, while also periodically referencing 
their implementation against North Korea. 
2.2. Nature of the Iranian Challenge 
Iran currently poses two major challenges to the international 
community:  (1) Iran is persisting with its nuclear program, in 
violation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and United 
Nations Security Council Resolutions 1737, 1747, and 1803;13 and 
(2) Iran is the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism, providing 
training, weapons, and hundreds of millions of dollars a year in 
funding to support various terrorist groups. 
 
12 See, e.g., Nevin John, RIL Gives in to US Pressure, Stops Gasoline to Iran, BUS. 
STANDARD, Jan. 7, 2009, http://www.business-standard.com/india/news 
/ril-gives-in-to-us-pressure-stops-gasoline-to-iran/17/36/345499/ (describing 
pressure exerted on Reliance Industries, an Indian company, to stop selling 
gasoline to Iran); Asjylyn Loder, Business with Iran May Mean None in Florida, ST. 
PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 7, 2008, at 1A (describing Florida State Senator Ted 
Deutch’s efforts to pressure Swiss company Vitol to stop selling gasoline to Iran). 
13 Readers interested in a more detailed analysis of the challenges posed by 
Iran’s nuclear program, and of that program’s violation of international law, may 
wish to refer to Kittrie, supra note 4, at 344–45, 379–91 and Iran Counter-
Proliferation Act of 2007: Hearing on S. 970 Before the S. Fin. Comm., 110th Cong. 
(2008) (statement of Professor Orde F. Kittrie), available at 
http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/testimony/2008test/040808oktest.pdf, from 
both of which this discussion is adapted. 
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2.2.1. Iran’s Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons 
Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons raises four major concerns.  
First, the Iranian government is already the world’s leading state 
sponsor of terrorism.14  An Iranian nuclear arsenal could serve Iran 
as a “nuclear umbrella,” making countries victimized by Iranian-
sponsored terrorism even more reluctant to retaliate against Iran.  
This could make Iran an even more self-confident sponsor of 
terrorism. 
Second, an Iranian nuclear arsenal could spur proliferation by 
its neighbors.  The fear that an Iranian nuclear arsenal will unleash 
a cascade of proliferation across the Middle East has been 
heightened by at least twelve Arab states in the last two-and-a-half 
years announcing plans to pursue nuclear technology.15  An 
editorial in the Egyptian government daily newspaper Al-Ahram 
put it as follows:  “Iran’s nuclear capability . . . will spur many 
powers in the region to develop a nuclear program.”16  Such a 
cascade of proliferation in the Middle East would likely lead to the 
worldwide collapse of the already tottering nuclear non-
proliferation treaty (“NPT”) regime.17  In addition, the proliferation 
 
14 See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEP’T OF 
STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2007, at 172 (2008), available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/105904.pdf [hereinafter 
COUNTRY REPORTS] (stating that in 2007 “Iran remained the most active state 
sponsor of terrorism”). 
15 See, e.g., William J. Broad & David E. Sanger, Fearing Iran, Arab States Seek 
Nuclear Power, INT’L HERALD TRIB., April 15, 2007, http://www.iht.com 
/articles/2007/04/15/news/nuke.php; Richard Beeston, Six Arab States Join Rush 
to Go Nuclear, TIMES (London), Nov. 4, 2006, at 1; INT’L INS. FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, 
NUCLEAR PROGRAMS IN THE MIDDLE EAST: IN THE SHADOW OF IRAN 7 (2008), available 
at http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/nuclear-programmes-in  
-the-middle-east-in-the-shadow-of-iran/read-the-dossier/. 
16 Hanna Avraham, Middle East Media Research Inst., Arab Media Reactions to 
Iran’s Nuclear Project, INQUIRY & ANALYSIS, May 23, 2006, http://memri.org/bin 
/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=ia&ID=IA27706; see also Roee Nahmias, 
Mubarak Hints: We’ll Develop Nukes, YNETNEWS, Jan. 5, 2007, 
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3348600,00.html (reporting that 
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak has hinted that if Iran proceeds to attain 
nuclear weapons, Egypt will follow suit). 
17 The U.N. Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change warned of “the erosion and possible collapse of the whole [nuclear 
nonproliferation] Treaty regime,” explaining: “[w]e are approaching a point at 
which the erosion of the non-proliferation regime could become irreversible and 
result in a cascade of proliferation.”  High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges & 
Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, ¶¶ 109–11, U.N. Doc. 
A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004). 
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of nuclear weapons in the Middle East tinderbox, with its border 
disputes, religious fanaticism, ethnic hatreds, unstable 
governments, terrorist groups, and tendency for conflicts to spiral 
out of control, seems likely to result in a devastating nuclear war. 
Some have also raised a third set of concerns:  that while 
mutual deterrence kept the United States and the Soviet Union 
from attacking each other during the Cold War, significant 
elements of Iran’s leadership may, by virtue of their apocalyptic 
messianism and exaltation of martyrdom, be impossible to deter 
from using nuclear weapons. 
The fourth major concern raised in response to Iran’s pursuit of 
nuclear weapons is that, even if the top echelon of the Iranian 
government turns out to be deterrable, there would be a 
considerable risk of rogue elements within Iran taking it upon 
themselves to transfer nuclear arms to Iran’s terrorist allies.  As 
was seen with Pakistan’s A.Q. Khan, who proliferated under the 
comparatively secular and responsible Musharraf government, one 
key rogue figure can be sufficient to share an insecure country’s 
nuclear technology with others.18 
2.2.2. Iran’s Sponsorship of Terrorism 
Another significant challenge is Iran’s provision of funding, 
training, and weapons to terrorist groups including Hamas, 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah, an organization that has 
killed more Americans than any terrorist network other than al 
Qaeda.19  Iran, a state sponsor of terrorism for decades,20 currently 
 
18 See, e.g., GORDON CORERA, SHOPPING FOR BOMBS: NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, 
GLOBAL INSECURITY, AND THE RISE AND FALL OF THE A.Q. KHAN NETWORK (2006).  
Readers interested in an overview of the challenges posed by Iran’s nuclear 
program, and of that program’s violation of international law, that is more 
detailed than that provided in this Article may wish to refer to Kittrie, supra note 
4, at 344–45, 379–91 and Iran Counter-Proliferation Act of 2007: Hearing on S. 970 
Before the S. Fin. Comm., 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Professor Orde F. 
Kittrie), available at http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/testimony/2008test 
/040808oktest.pdf, from both of which this discussion is adapted. 
19 See, e.g., COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 14, at 172; Between Feckless and 
Reckless: U.S. Policy Options to Prevent a Nuclear Iran: Joint Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on the Middle East and South Asia, and the Subcomm. on Terrorism, 
Nonproliferation and Trade of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. 24 (2008) 
[hereinafter Glaser Statement] (statement of Daniel Glaser, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury), 
available at http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/41849.pdf. 
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spends hundreds of millions of dollars each year to fund 
terrorism.21 
2.2.3. Iran’s Use of the International Financial System to 
Accomplish Its Nuclear and Terrorism Sponsorship 
Objectives 
Iran utilizes the international financial system to accomplish 
both its nuclear and its terrorism sponsorship objectives.  Iran’s 
integration into the international financial system both provides 
the Iranian government with the global financial capability to 
support its nuclear and terrorism sponsorship activities and 
exposes elements of the international financial system to a risk of 
facilitating these activities.  In order to avoid suspicion and 
minimize the risk of detection, Iran’s state-owned banks and other 
entities use an array of deceptive practices when using their global 
financial ties to advance Iran’s nuclear program and sponsorship of 
terrorism.  For example, Iran uses front companies and 
intermediaries to surreptitiously obtain technology and materials 
for its nuclear and missile programs from countries that would 
prohibit such exports to Iran.22 
In addition, Iranian banks ask other financial institutions to 
remove the Iranian banks’ names when processing their 
transactions through the international financial system.23  The goal 
is to allow Iranian banks to remain undetected as they move 
money through the international financial system to pay for the 
Iranian government’s nuclear and missile related purchases and to 
fund terrorism.24  The name-removal tactic is intended to evade the 
controls put in place by responsible financial institutions further 
down the line and has the effect of potentially involving those 
institutions in transactions that are illegal, that place their 
reputations at risk, and that they would never engage in if they 
knew who was really involved.25  Iran’s reliance on deceptive 
 
20 See, e.g., Orde F. Kittrie, Emboldened by Impunity: The History and 
Consequences of Failure to Enforce Iranian Violations of International Law, 57 SYRACUSE 
L. REV. 519 (2007) (providing a history of Iran’s sponsorship of terrorist activities). 
21 Glaser Statement, supra note 19, at 27. 
22 Id.   
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Remarks by Treasury Sec’y 
Paulson on Targeted Fin. Measures to Protect Our Nat’l Sec. (June 14, 2007) 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss3/3
 
2009]    TREASURY’S INNOVATIVE FINANCIAL SANCTIONS 797 
financial transactions to support its nuclear and terrorism 
sponsorship activities has contributed to its unwillingness to meet 
international standards for the development and implementation 
of laws and enforcement capabilities that would allow it to detect 
and prevent money laundering or terrorist financing.26 
3. THE NEW BREED OF FINANCIAL SANCTIONS:  IMPACTFUL 
INNOVATION 
The U.S. government has in recent years adopted a remarkably 
impactful and exceptionally innovative multifaceted strategy for 
countering Iran’s use of financial transactions to support its nuclear 
and terrorism sponsorship activities.  This strategy has 
significantly complicated Iran’s use of financial transactions for 
these purposes.  Even more importantly, the strong impact on 
Iran’s economy of the financial pressure created by this strategy 
has provided U.S. policymakers with perhaps their greatest current 
source of leverage over Iran. 
3.1. Impact 
In response to the new breed of U.S. government financial 
sanctions on Iran, more than eighty banks around the world, 
including “[m]ost of the world’s top financial institutions,”27 have 
curtailed business with Iran.28  Some leading financial institutions 
have dramatically scaled back their Iran-related business, while 
others have halted it entirely.29  The withdrawal of major global 
banks from the Iranian market has disrupted key Iranian trading 
relationships, including those in the energy sector.30  As a result of 
 
[hereinafter Paulson Remarks], available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases 
/hp457.htm. 
26 See Glaser Statement, supra note 19, at 28 (“Iran uses its global financial ties 
to pursue both the threat of terrorism and nuclear program through an array of 
deceptive practices specifically designed to avoid suspicion and evade detection 
from the international financial community.”). 
27 Paulson Remarks, supra note 25. 
28 See Robin Wright, Stuart Levey’s War, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 2, 2008, at 29, 
31 (noting that “[s]o far, more than 80 banks have curtailed business with Iran” 
including several prominent European and Middle Eastern banks). 
29 See Glaser Statement, supra note 19, at 34 (“Many leading financial 
institutions have either scaled back dramatically or even terminated their Iran-
related business entirely.”). 
30 See Bank Jitters Hit Iran Fuel Imports, PETROLEUM ECONOMIST, Feb. 2008, at 28 
(concluding that due to U.S.-led sanctions “Iran is starting to feel the effect of 
international sanctions on its domestic energy sector”); Paul Sampson, Iran: 
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the financial sanctions, it has reportedly become almost impossible 
in Europe to arrange for transactions involving Iranian companies 
utilizing a letter of credit, the standard payment guarantee used in 
international trade.31  For example, Reliance Industries, an Indian 
company, was forced to halt its gasoline sales to Iran for several 
months because it could no longer arrange from French banks the 
letters of credit on which the transactions had depended.32  The 
sanctions have also affected Iran’s ability to finance petroleum 
development projects, with Iran’s Oil Minister admitting that 
“overseas banks and financiers have decreased their cooperation” 
on such projects.33  Overall, the financial sanctions have reportedly 
increased the cost of imports to Iran by some twenty to thirty 
percent.34 
Also, as a result of the financial sanctions, the number of 
foreign banks with branches in Iran dropped from forty-six to 
twenty between 2006 and 2008.35  Meanwhile, the financial 
sanctions have reportedly contributed to seventeen of Iran’s state 
and privately owned banks “struggling with credit shortages 
which have brought them close to insolvency.”36 
 
Products in Flux, ENERGY COMPASS, Feb. 8, 2008, at 1 (stating that due to the “US-
led squeeze on Iran” many financial institutions have ceased to provide credit to 
Iranian companies); Mark Trevelyan, More Companies Suspend Business with Iran, 
INT’L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 17, 2008, at 15 (discussing the effects of sanctions on 
“Iran’s oil-based economy”). 
31 See Trevelyan, supra note 30, at 15 (quoting a senior German banking and 
finance consultant as stating that “[i]t is today impossible more or less in Europe, 
with a couple of exceptions, to get a letter of credit” for trade with Iran). 
32 See id. (“Late last year, the Indian oil refiner Reliance halted sales of 
gasoline and diesel to Tehran after the French banks BNP Paribas and the Calyon 
unit of Crédit Agricole stopped offering letters of credit . . . .”). 
33 Robin Wright, Iran Feels Pinch as Major Banks Curtail Business: U.S. 
Campaign Urges Firms to Cut Ties, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 2007, at A10 (quoting 
Iranian Oil Minister Kazem Vaziri Hamaneh). 
34 See David Blair, Banks Recruited to Wage Financial War on Teheran, DAILY 
TELEGRAPH (London), Sept. 18, 2007, at 17 (“One Teheran newspaper recently 
reported that Iranian companies had seen their import costs rise by 20 or 30 per 
cent because they had to employ middlemen to evade financial restrictions.”). 
35 Steven R. Weisman, World Group Tells Banks to Beware Deals with Iran, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 29, 2008, at A10 (citing an American diplomat as noting a drop in the 
foreign bank branches operating in Iran). 
36 The Iranian Economy Is Imploding, 71 APS REVIEW DOWNSTREAM TRENDS, Dec. 
15, 2008, available at http://www.allbusiness.com/economy-economic-indicators 
/economic-conditions-inflation/11731056-1.html; see also The Party’s Over: Iran’s 
President Ahmadinejad Has Had a Good Run. For How Much Longer?, ECONOMIST, 
Nov. 22, 2008, at 59 (noting that the President of Iran’s banking policies have 
pushed many lenders “to the brink of insolvency”). 
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In November 2008, sixty leading Iranian economists called in 
an open letter for the regime to drastically change course, saying 
that Iran’s “‘tension-creating’ foreign policy has ‘scared off foreign 
investment and inflicted heavy damage’ on the economy.”37  The 
economists said the current sanctions have cost Iran “many billions 
of dollars” by forcing a “large part” of its imports and exports to be 
“carried out through middlemen.”38 
3.2. Innovations 
The U.S. government’s multifaceted financial sanctions strategy 
against Iran includes several innovations that seem likely to impact 
the design of future sanctions against other targets.39  These 
innovations include: direct outreach to individual foreign private 
financial institutions, aggressive use of financial authorities to 
pursue political goals, and effective development and harnessing 
of intelligence about global financial transactions. 
 
37 Borzou Daragahi, Economists in Iran Criticize Ahmadinejad, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 
10, 2008, at A3. 
38 Sixty Iranian Economists Write Open Letter to President, BBC MONITORING 
WORLDWIDE, Nov. 14, 2008, at 3. 
39 The financial measures against Iran were inspired at least in part by the 
Treasury Department’s prior success in using similar financial measures against 
North Korea.  In September 2005, the Treasury Department, acting under section 
311 of the USA PATRIOT Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5318A (2006), cited Macau-based Banco 
Delta Asia as a “primary money laundering concern” for its financial interactions 
with North Korea.  Imposition of Special Measure Against Banco Delta Asia 
SARL, 70 Fed. Reg. 52,217, 55,219 (Sept. 20, 2005).  As a result, many international 
private financial institutions cut or reduced their ties to North Korea, and the 
Macau government took over Banco Delta Asia and froze over $24 million dollars 
in North Korean funds.  Michael Jacobson, Sanctions Against Iran: A Promising 
Struggle, 31 WASH. Q. 69, 72 (2008); Steven R. Weisman, The Ripples of Punishing 
One Bank, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2007, at C1 (stating that Macau froze $25 million of 
North Korean assets held by fifty-two different holders).  Although the amount of 
money at stake was small, the designation of Banco Delta Asia, in combination 
with the designation of several North Korean entities as primary money 
laundering concerns has resulted in “North Korea’s virtual isolation from the 
global financial system.”  Paulson Remarks, supra note 25.  This halt in North 
Korea’s access to the international financial system provided very important 
leverage for the United States in its negotiations with North Korea over the latter’s 
nuclear program.  See Jacobson, supra note 39, at 73 (stating that financial 
measures had a “considerable impact” on negotiations with the North Koreans).  
The North Korean effort drew lessons from earlier, somewhat analogous 
programs aimed at Colombian narcotics traffickers.  See Paulson Remarks, supra 
note 25 (“We have drawn on lessons learned from earlier programs aimed at 
Colombian drug cartels.”). 
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In developing and implementing its multifaceted financial 
sanctions strategy, the United States has used the U.N. Security 
Council where possible, but has also found a way to work outside 
of it.  To maximize its effectiveness operating outside of the 
Security Council, the United States has worked to persuade not 
only individual foreign governments but also individual non-
American companies to join the effort.  Bringing such non-
American companies on board was “a particularly daunting 
challenge given the limits of U.S. jurisdiction over foreign 
entities.”40  However, once private sector financial institutions are 
on board, they are “able to act much more quickly than 
governments who often lack the necessary authority or the political 
will to take action on their own”41 or may face cumbersome 
bureaucratic procedures for exercising whatever relevant authority 
they do have.  The strategy’s approach to bringing such non-
American companies on board, and its success in doing so—both 
described in more detail in Section 4.3 of this Article—have been 
one of the strategy’s most significant innovations. 
Another of the strategy’s most innovative aspects is its use of 
the U.S. Treasury Department’s financial authorities to pursue 
political goals.  “It is certainly a very new and effective tool,” said 
Robert Einhorn, the State Department’s former Assistant Secretary 
for Nonproliferation.42  “Years ago, people at State would go to 
Treasury and say, ‘We’ve got a lot of financial muscle, we should 
use it to pursue political goals.’  But Treasury would always say it 
didn’t want to mess around with the international financial 
system.”43  Indicative of Treasury’s novel approach is Bush 
Administration Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson’s statement that 
he and his finance ministry counterparts around the world have a 
“responsibility” to “broaden our role beyond economic 
stewardship and become valuable contributors to help ensure our 
countries’ and our citizens’ security.”44  James Wilkinson, chief of 
staff of the Bush Administration Treasury Department, noted that, 
“[o]ur financial tools are sometimes the most powerful weapons 
 
40 Jacobson, supra note 39, at 71. 
41 Paulson Remarks, supra note 25. 
42 Bay Fang, Treasury Wields Financial Sanctions: U.S. Strategy Straddles the Line 
Between Diplomacy, Military Might, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 23, 2007, at C1. 
43 Id. (quoting Robert Einhorn, Former Assistant Sec’y of State for Non-
proliferation). 
44 Paulson Remarks, supra note 25. 
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our government has to help change behavior.”45  In the past, 
sanctions have focused largely on leveraging international trade in 
goods, for example through the use of trade embargoes.  
Treasury’s newfound willingness to use its financial muscle to 
pursue political goals is particularly and increasingly important 
because “[g]lobal financial flows are growing rapidly and greatly 
exceed the trade in goods and services.”46 
The United States’ new financial sanctions have been impactful 
in part because Treasury has effectively developed and harnessed 
intelligence about global financial transactions.  In an era of 
globalization, such intelligence is increasingly available, because 
“technology and integration have made it more difficult for anyone 
using the financial system to hide.”47  In order to be useful for 
purposes of these sanctions, the intelligence must be accurate.48  It 
also must be shareable, in a way that traditional intelligence, which 
depends heavily on sources and methods that are themselves 
secret, is often not.  Fortuitously, transactions using the 
international financial system “typically leave a trail of detailed 
information . . . [o]pening an account or initiating a funds transfer 
requires a name, an address, a phone number” that is collected and 
stored by a financial institution.49  Such information can be used to 
identify key actors and their networks.50  In 2004, the U.S. Treasury 
Department became the world’s first finance ministry to develop 
in-house expertise in the collection and analysis of such 
information.51 
One might expect that rogue actors eager to avoid detection 
would avoid the formal financial system and rely instead on 
moving money using such methods as hawala that can be 
effectuated without the creation of official financial records.  
However, Treasury has found that for rogue actors there is 
sometimes “no good alternative and, in many cases, no alternative 
 
45 Weisman, supra note 39. 
46 Paulson Remarks, supra note 25. 
47 Id. 
48 As Treasury Secretary Paulson has stated: “[t]o identify and act against 
threats, we need specific, current, and reliable intelligence.”  Id. 
49 Id. 
50 See id. (“Treasury then evaluates this information with an eye towards 
potential action—be it a designation, an advisory to the private sector, or a 
conversation to alert other finance ministers to a particular threat or bad actor.”). 
51 Id. 
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at all” to the formal international financial system.52  Proliferation 
networks turn out to require letters of credit and other types of 
financing for many of their purchases.53  Those otherwise 
legitimate businessmen or manufacturers who participate in a 
proliferation transaction because of profit, rather than ideology, 
may find it harder to turn a blind eye or may be otherwise 
discomfited by a transaction that avoids the formal financial 
system. 
Rogue states turn out to depend on the global financial system 
for such functions as holding reserves and financing both their 
revenue-earning exports and their imports of such strategic 
commodities as gasoline.54  Even terrorist networks still sometimes 
attempt to move funds through the international financial system, 
such as when they find the alternatives to be even riskier or too 
cumbersome.55  While individual terrorist attacks have been shown 
to be relatively inexpensive to carry out, “global terrorist groups 
need large sums of money to pay operatives, to recruit and train 
members, to acquire false documents and travel.”56 
Intelligence about specific financial transactions has proven 
important to the financial sanctions’ success because it has enabled 
Treasury to present the sanctions as “specifically targeted against 
those individuals or entities engaging in illicit conduct.”57  Bush 
Administration Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson said that as a 
result of the U.S. government’s effective development and 
harnessing of intelligence about global financial transactions, 
“[r]ather than grudgingly complying with, or even trying to evade 
our sanctions, we have seen the banking industry in particular 
voluntarily go above and beyond their legal requirements because 
they do not want to do business with terrorist supporters, money 
launderers or proliferators.”58 
As a result of these innovations, Treasury’s new financial 
sanctions have proven an exception to the traditional reputation of 
 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Thus when Iran could no longer make use of French bank letters of credit 
for financing its purchases of gasoline from India’s Reliance Industries; Reliance 
for a time stopped its exports of gasoline to Iran. 
55 Paulson Remarks, supra note 25. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
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sanctions as ineffective in putting pressure on rogue regimes, 
harmful to innocent persons, riddled with cheating by private 
businesses that evade sanctions while their governments turn a 
blind eye, or all three.59 
In sharp contrast to the traditional reputation of sanctions, at 
least some foreign banks have gone even beyond the letter of the 
law in implementing the financial sanctions.  In addition, the 
financial sanctions have clearly had a significant impact on the 
Iranian economy, costing the Iranian government funds that might 
otherwise have gone towards furthering its nuclear ambitions or 
supporting terrorism. 
However, it is important to note that as of February 2009, there 
was no sign that the financial sanctions have succeeded in coercing 
the Iranian government into halting either its nuclear program or 
its support for terrorism.  In part as a result, the two major party 
Presidential candidates, Barack Obama and John McCain, called 
during the campaign for increasing sanctions pressure on Iran if it 
persists in illicit activity.60  The implication of both candidates’ 
 
59 Id. 
60 For example, on June 4, 2008, Senator Obama said at a speech in 
Washington, D.C.:  
We will pursue this diplomacy with no illusions about the Iranian 
regime.  Instead, we will present a clear choice: If you abandon your 
dangerous nuclear program, your support for terror, and your threats to 
Israel, there will be meaningful incentives, including the lifting of 
sanctions and political and economic integration with the international 
community.  If you refuse, we will ratchet up the pressure . . . [w]e 
should work with Europe, Japan, and the gulf states to find every avenue 
outside the United Nations to isolate the Iranian regime, from cutting off 
loan guarantees and expanding financial sanctions, to banning the export 
of refined petroleum to Iran, to boycotting firms associated with the 
Iranian Revolutionary Guard, who[se] Quds Forces have rightly been 
labeled a terrorist organization. 
Senator Barack Obama, Remarks at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee 
Annual Conference (June 4, 2008) (transcript available at 
http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/04 
/AR2008060401325.html).  On June 2, 2008, Senator McCain said the following in 
a speech in Washington, DC: 
[W]e must create the real-world pressures that will peacefully but 
decisively change the path they [Iran] are on.  Essential to this strategy is 
the U.N. Security Council, which should impose progressively tougher 
political and economic sanctions.  Should the Security Council continue 
to delay in this responsibility, the United States must lead like-minded 
countries in imposing multilateral sanctions outside the U.N. framework. 
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positions seemed to be that there is a tipping point at which 
economic pressures and protests could convince the regime that its 
“tension-creating” foreign policy poses too great a risk to its grip 
over the Iranian people, but that the financial sanctions, as efficient 
and impactful as they have been, have been insufficiently powerful 
to reach that tipping point.  The Obama Administration’s 
extraordinary decision to retain in place Stuart Levey, the Bush-
appointed Under Secretary of the Treasury who has been the 
principal architect of the financial sanctions,61 is a vote of 
confidence in the financial sanctions and an indication that their 
design will have a strong influence on any Obama Administration 
efforts to increase the range and impact of sanctions on Iran. 
4. DELINEATION OF THE U.S. STRATEGY FOR COMBATING IRAN’S 
MISUSE OF THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND 
APPLYING FINANCIAL PRESSURE TO IRAN 
The U.S. government’s overall strategy for combating Iran’s 
misuse of the international financial system and for applying 
financial pressure to Iran consists of the following three 
interrelated initiatives:  (1) direct imposition by the United States of 
unilateral financial sanctions targeting Iran’s nuclear and terrorism 
sponsorship activities; (2) promoting financial measures against 
Iran by key international organizations and foreign governments; 
and (3) direct outreach to key foreign financial institutions. 
4.1. Direct Imposition by the United States of Unilateral Financial 
Sanctions Targeting Iran’s Nuclear and Terrorism Sponsorship 
Activities 
The United States has had wide-ranging sanctions in place on 
Iran since shortly after the November 4, 1979 seizure by Iran of 
American diplomats at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran.62  However, 
the U.S. strategy for countering Iran’s use of financial transactions 
to support its nuclear and terrorism sponsorship activities and for 
applying financial pressure to Iran relies heavily on two relatively 
recent Executive Orders. 
 
Senator John McCain, Speech on the Middle East (June 2, 2008) (transcript 
available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/16395/). 
61 Wright, supra note 28 (discussing Under Secretary Levey’s campaign to 
promote financial sanctions). 
62 KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IRAN: U.S. CONCERNS AND 
POLICY RESPONSES 49 (2008). 
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4.1.1. Executive Order 13382 
Executive Order 13382 of June 28, 200563 provides for freezing 
(blocking) the assets of designated persons engaged in 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (and their means of 
delivery) and their support networks.  Designations under 
Executive Order 13382 prohibit all transactions between the 
designees and any U.S. person, and freeze any assets the designees 
may have under U.S. jurisdiction.  Executive Order 13382 initially 
applied to eight organizations in North Korea, Iran, and Syria.  
However, the Executive Order provides that Treasury and State 
Departments may designate additional WMD proliferators and 
their supporters, and they have designated dozens of additional 
individuals and entities in the last several years,64 including over 
 
63 Exec. Order No. 13,382, 70 Fed. Reg. 38,567 (July 1, 2005).  In the chapeau of 
Executive Order 13382, the President specified that he was acting under the 
authority vested in him “as President by the Constitution and the laws of the 
United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 
U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code.”  Id.  3 U.S.C. § 
301 is the President’s general authorization to delegate functions to subordinate 
officials and 50 U.S.C. § 1601 addresses the termination of existing declared 
emergencies.  The key statutory authority for Executive Order 13382 is IEEPA, a 
little-known statute which provides the President with extraordinarily powerful 
authorities “to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its 
source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national 
security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares 
a national emergency with respect to such threat.”  International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1707 (2006).  Once the President has 
declared such a national emergency, he may pursuant to IEEPA prohibit the 
following with respect to “any person, or with respect to any property, subject to 
the jurisdiction of the United States”: “transfers of credit or payments between, 
by, through, or to any banking institution, to the extent that such transfers or 
payments involve any interest of any foreign country or a national thereof.”  50 
U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(A)(ii).  Once such a national emergency has been declared, the 
President may also pursuant to IEEPA block, “nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, 
any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, 
importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or 
privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any 
foreign country or a national thereof has any interest by any person, or with 
respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.”  50 U.S.C. 
§ 1702(a)(1)(B). 
64 See OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. DEP’T. TREASURY, WHAT YOU 
NEED TO KNOW ABOUT TREASURY RESTRICTIONS (Jan. 16, 2009) available at 
http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/programs/wmd/wmd.pdf 
(explaining that Executive Order 13382 authorized “Treasury, together with the 
Department of State” to “designate additional WMD proliferators and their 
supporters” and providing a list of such entities that have been blocked under this 
authority). 
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fifty Iran-related individuals and entities.65  Iranian entities 
designated for their direct involvement in production of weapons 
of mass destruction and their delivery systems include the Atomic 
Energy Organization of Iran, Iran’s Aerospace Industries 
Organization, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), 
and Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics.66 
The U.S. government has also designated under Executive 
Order 13382 several state-owned Iranian banks, including Bank 
Sepah, Bank Melli, and Bank Mellat.  Bank Sepah was designated 
in January 2007 for “provid[ing] a variety of critical financial 
services to Iran’s missile industry,” including “facilitat[ing] Iran’s 
international purchases of sensitive material for its missile 
program” through “its role as a financial conduit.”67  Bank Melli, 
Iran’s largest bank, was designated in October 2007 for providing a 
range of “banking services to entities involved in Iran’s nuclear 
and ballistic missile programs, including entities listed by the U.N. 
for their involvement in those programs.”68  Bank Melli “facilitated 
numerous purchases of sensitive materials for Iran’s nuclear and 
missile programs.”69  In the process of “handling financial 
transactions on behalf of the IRGC, Bank Melli . . . employed 
deceptive banking practices,” such as requesting that its name be 
removed from financial transactions, to hide its involvement from 
the international banking system.70  Bank Mellat was designated in 
October 2007 for “provid[ing] banking services in support of Iran’s 
 
65 See Glaser Statement, supra note 19, at 19 (noting that the “Departments of 
State and Treasury announced the designation of dozens of entities and 
individuals” in 2007). 
66 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t. of the Treasury, Fact Sheet: Designation of 
Iranian Entities and Individuals for Proliferation Activities and Support for 
Terrorism (Oct. 25, 2007), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases 
/hp644.htm.  The designation of the IRGC, which explicitly included a list of 
companies owned or controlled by the IRGC and its leaders, has a particularly 
strong impact on the Iranian economy because, as Treasury noted, the “IRGC has 
significant political and economic power in Iran, with ties to companies 
controlling billions of dollars in business and construction and a growing 
presence in Iran’s financial and commercial sectors.”  Id.  “The IRGC,” Treasury 
noted, “is involved in a diverse array of activities, including petroleum 
production and major construction projects across the country.”  Id. 
67 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Iran’s Bank Sepah Designated by 
Treasury: Sepah Facilitating Iran’s Weapons Program (Jan. 9, 2007), available at 
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp219.htm. 
68 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, supra note 66. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
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nuclear entities” and “facilitat[ing] the movement of millions of 
dollars for Iran’s nuclear program.”71 
4.1.2. Executive Order 13224 
Executive Order 13224 of September 23, 2001, authorizes the 
Treasury Department to designate, and block the assets of, foreign 
persons determined “to have committed, or to pose a significant 
risk of committing, acts of terrorism that threaten the security of 
U.S. nationals or the national security, foreign policy, or economy 
of the United States.”72  In addition, the order authorizes Treasury 
to block the assets of persons that provide support, services, or 
 
71 Id. 
72 Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001).  In the chapeau 
of Executive Order 13224, President Bush specified that he was acting under the 
authority vested in him as President “by the Constitution and the laws of the 
United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 
U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), section 5 of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, as 
amended (22 U.S.C. 287c) (UNPA), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, 
and in view of United Nations Security Council Resolution[s]” 1214, 1267, 1333, 
and 1363. Id.  IEEPA, the National Emergencies Act, and 3 U.S.C. § 301 are 
discussed as part of the analysis of Executive Order 13382.  See supra note 63 and 
accompanying text.  Section 5 of the UNPA, which the President cited in 
Executive Order 13224, but not Executive Order 13382, provides in relevant part 
as follows: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, whenever the United 
States is called upon by the Security Council to apply measures which 
said Council has decided, pursuant to article 41 of said Charter, are to be 
employed to give effect to its decisions under said Charter, the President 
may, to the extent necessary to apply such measures, through any 
agency which he may designate, and under such orders, rules, and 
regulations as may be prescribed by him, investigate, regulate, or 
prohibit, in whole or in part, economic relations or rail, sea, air, postal, 
telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication between any 
foreign country or any national thereof or any person therein and the 
United States or any person subject to the jurisdiction thereof, or 
involving any property subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. 
22 U.S.C. § 287c (2006).  The four Security Council Resolutions listed in the 
chapeau of Executive Order 13224 all focus on the Taliban.  However, the 
designation authority that Treasury draws from the UNPA through Executive 
Order 13224 is not limited to application of measures required by those four 
particular, Taliban-oriented Security Council Resolutions.  In light of that, while 
IEEPA is clearly the foundational statutory authority for designation under 
Executive Order 13224 of Iranian entities for their support of terrorist groups, the 
UNPA also provides important statutory authority in those cases where 
Treasury’s designation is helping to implement measures required by the Security 
Council pursuant to article 41 of the U.N. Charter. 
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assistance to, or are “otherwise associated with” terrorists and 
terrorist organizations designated under the Order.73 
In October 2007, Treasury designated under Executive Order 
13224 the Qods Force branch of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
Corps for “provid[ing] material support to the Taliban, Lebanese 
Hizballah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command.”74  In 
designating the Qods Force under Executive Order 13224, Treasury 
noted that the “Qods Force provides weapons and financial 
support to the Taliban to support anti-U.S. and anti-Coalition 
activity in Afghanistan” in contravention of legally-binding 
Security Council Resolutions.75  Treasury also noted that the Qods 
Force operates training camps for Hizballah, “provides roughly 
$100 to $200 million in funding a year to Hizballah and has assisted 
Hizballah in rearming in violation of U.N. Security Council 
Resolution 1701.”76  The State Department has elsewhere stated 
that the Qods Force provides: 
Iraqi militants with Iranian-produced advanced rockets, 
sniper rifles, automatic weapons, mortars that have killed 
thousands of Coalition and Iraqi Forces, and explosively 
formed projectiles (EFPs) that have a higher lethality rate 
than other types of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), 
and are specially designed to defeat armored vehicles used 
by Coalition Forces.77 
Treasury has also designated under Executive Order 13224 
Iran’s state-owned Bank Saderat.78  Bank Saderat was designated in 
October 2007 for being “used by the Government of Iran to channel 
funds to terrorist organizations, including Hizballah and EU-
designated terrorist groups Hamas, PFLP-GC, and Palestinian 
Islamic Jihad.”79  In designating Bank Saderat, Treasury noted that 
“from 2001 to 2006, Bank Saderat transferred $50 million from the 
 
73 Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079, 49,080 (Sept. 23, 2001). 
74 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, supra note 66. 
 75 Id.  
76 Id. 
77 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 14, at 173. 
78 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, supra note 66 (designating 
Bank Saderat, its branches, and its subsidiaries as supporters of terrorism under 
Executive Order 13224). 
79 Id. 
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Central Bank of Iran through its subsidiary in London to its branch 
in Beirut for the benefit of Hizballah fronts in Lebanon that support 
acts of violence,” that Hamas has “had substantial assets deposited 
in Bank Saderat,” and that “in the past year, Bank Saderat has 
transferred several million dollars to Hamas.”80 
4.2. Promoting Financial Measures Against Iran by Key International 
Organizations and Foreign Countries 
Recognizing that sanctions, including those in the financial 
arena, are almost always more effective when they are multilateral, 
the U.S. government’s initiative to combat Iran’s misuse of the 
international financial system and to apply financial pressure on 
Iran has placed considerable emphasis on promoting financial 
measures against Iran by key international organizations and 
foreign countries.  These efforts have focused on:  (1) including 
financial components in U.N. Security Council Resolutions 
addressing Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, and (2) working 
within the multinational Financial Action Task Force (FATF). 
4.2.1. Financial Components in U.N. Security Council Resolutions 
Addressing Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Programs 
As of February 2009, the three principal United Nations 
Security Council Resolutions imposing sanctions on Iran in 
response to its nuclear program are Resolution 1737 of December 
23, 2006,81 Resolution 1747 of March 24, 2007,82 and Resolution 1803 
of March 3, 2008.83  These resolutions contain three principal types 
of financial components:  (1) financial sanctions targeting specified 
key actors associated with Iranian nuclear and missile programs, 
(2) requirements that member states prohibit certain financial 
activities relating to Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, and (3) a 
call on member states to exercise vigilance over the activities of 
financial institutions in their territories with all Iranian financial 
institutions. 
 
80 Id. 
81 S.C. Res. 1737, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1737 (Dec. 23, 2006). 
82 S.C. Res. 1747, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1747 (Mar. 24, 2007). 
83 S.C. Res. 1803, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1803 (Mar. 3, 2008). 
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4.2.1.1. Financial Sanctions Targeting Specified Key Actors 
Associated With Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Programs 
Paragraph 12 of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1737 requires 
all member states to freeze any assets on their territories that are 
owned or controlled by persons or entities designated by the 
Security Council or the implementing Committee as “being 
engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s 
proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or the development of 
nuclear weapon delivery systems.”84  Paragraph 12 also requires 
member states to “ensure that any funds, financial assets or 
economic resources are prevented from being made available by 
their nationals or by any persons or entities within their territories, 
to or for the benefit of” designated persons and entities.85  
Resolution 1737 designated ten entities and twelve individuals.86  
By doing so, Resolution 1737 required all member states to freeze 
the designees’ assets and effectively deny them access to the 
international financial system. 
Three months later, Resolution 1747 added thirteen additional 
entities and fifteen additional individuals to the list of designees 
subject to paragraph 12 of Resolution 1737.87  Alongside various 
military, research, and manufacturing entities and individuals, the 
list of designees in Resolution 1747 included Bank Sepah, Bank 
Sepah International, and Ahmad Derakhshandeh, the Chairman 
and Managing Director of Bank Sepah.88  The Iranian and 
international banking community were thus put on notice that 
even the relatively cautious United Nations Security Council is 
willing to put bankers who finance proliferation in the same 
category of sanctions targets as the military officers, research 
scientists, and manufacturers who directly handle nuclear 
components and missile delivery systems. 
Eleven months after the passage of Resolution 1747, Resolution 
1803 added twelve more entities and thirteen more individuals to 
the list of designees subject to paragraph 12 of Resolution 1737.89  
Since several of the designees under Resolutions 1737, 1747, and 
 
84 S.C. Res. 1737, supra note 81, ¶ 12. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. Annex. 
87 S.C. Res. 1747, supra note 82, ¶ 4, Annex I. 
88 Id. Annex I. 
89 S.C. Res. 1803, supra note 83, ¶ 7, Annexes I, III. 
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1803 had previously been publicly designated by the U.S. 
government under Executive Order 13382, the three Security 
Council Resolutions had the effect of multilateralizing aspects of 
Treasury’s unilateral actions against Iran’s proliferation 
infrastructure.90  For example, Bank Sepah was designated by 
Treasury under Executive Order 13382 in January 2007 and then by 
the United Nations Security Council in Resolution 1747 of March 
2007. 
4.2.1.2. Requirements that Member States Prohibit Certain 
Financial Activities Relating to Iran’s Nuclear and 
Missile Programs 
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1737 also requires all member 
states to “prevent the provision to Iran” of any “financial 
assistance, investment, brokering or other services, and the transfer 
of financial resources or services, related to the supply, sale, 
transfer, manufacture or use” of certain specified items, materials, 
equipment, goods and technology associated with Iran’s nuclear 
and missile programs.91  This “effectively prohibits the provision of 
financial services that would allow Iran to procure the prohibited 
items needed for nuclear or missile programs.”92 
4.2.1.3. Call To Exercise Vigilance Over Activities With All 
Iranian Financial Institutions 
In addition to imposing sanctions on proliferation-related 
entities and individuals, and requiring member states to prohibit 
financial activity directly related to Iran’s nuclear and missile 
programs, the Security Council’s Iran resolutions recognized the 
role that a broad range of interactions between the international 
financial community and a potentially proliferating state can play 
in facilitating, hindering, encouraging, or discouraging 
proliferation.  Resolution 1747 got the ball rolling by calling upon 
“all states and international financial institutions not to enter into 
new commitments for grants, financial assistance, and concessional 
 
90 See Glaser Statement, supra note 19, at 29–31 (noting that several Iranian 
financial institutions have been sanctioned both by Executive Order 13382 and 
U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1737, 1747, and 1803). 
91 S.C. Res. 1737, supra note 81, ¶ 6. 
92 Glaser Statement, supra note 19, at 33. 
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loans, to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, except for 
humanitarian and developmental purposes.”93 
Resolution 1803 goes further.  In paragraph nine, it: 
[c]alls upon all States to exercise vigilance in entering into 
new commitments for public provided financial support for 
trade with Iran, including the granting of export credits, 
guarantees or insurance, to their nationals or entities 
involved in such trade, in order to avoid such financial 
support contributing to the proliferation sensitive nuclear 
activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon 
delivery systems . . . .94 
This provision is important because even some of the United 
States’ closest allies, including France, Germany, and Italy, had 
been providing their companies with export loan guarantees to 
encourage and facilitate trade with Iran.95  A partial result is that 
the EU has been Iran’s largest trading partner, accounting for more 
than a third of Iran’s trade with the world.96 
Of particular importance for purposes of Treasury’s financial 
sanctions strategy, Resolution 1803, in paragraph ten: 
[c]alls upon all States to exercise vigilance over the 
activities of financial institutions in their territories with all 
banks domiciled in Iran, in particular with Bank Melli and 
Bank Saderat, and their branches and subsidiaries abroad, 
in order to avoid such activities contributing to the 
proliferation sensitive nuclear activities, or to the 
development of nuclear weapon delivery systems . . . .97 
As signaled by the “calls upon” formulation with which all 
three of these provisions begin, none of them is legally binding.  
The U.S. Department of the Treasury has nevertheless deemed the 
“all banks domiciled in Iran” provision contained in paragraph 10 
 
93 S.C. Res. 1747, supra note 82, ¶ 7. 
94 S.C. Res. 1803, supra note 83, ¶ 9 (emphasis omitted). 
95 See Jacobson, supra note 39, at 70 (noting the EU’s extensive ties to Iran 
where France, Italy, and Germany each encourage exports to Iran through 
“extensive export credit guarantees”). 
96 See Neil King, Jr. & Marc Champion, Embargo Politics: Nations’ Rich Trade 
with Iran is Hurdle for Sanctions Plan, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 2006, at A1 (discussing 
the extent of trade between Europe and Iran and its implications for proposed 
sanctions). 
97 S.C. Res. 1803, supra note 83, ¶ 10 (emphasis omitted). 
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of Resolution 1803 to be of  “critical importance,” as it 
“significantly reinforces the concerns Treasury has expressed for 
many months regarding some Iranian financial institutions’ 
deceptive financial conduct and terrorism and proliferation 
support activities.”98 
4.2.2. Working Within the Financial Action Task Force 
The Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”) is an inter-
governmental body dedicated to developing and promoting 
policies, both at national and international levels, “to combat 
money laundering and terrorist financing.”99  The FATF currently 
has thirty-four members, including the five permanent members of 
the United Nations Security Council, the European Commission, 
Italy, and Japan.100  The FATF is the premier inter-governmental 
body setting standards for anti-money laundering (“AML”) and 
combating financing of terrorism (“CFT”) policies and laws.  The 
FATF’s AML/CFT standards have been endorsed by the World 
Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the United Nations 
and are recognized by more than 175 countries.101 
In addition to setting AML/CFT standards, the FATF also 
identifies jurisdictions with serious vulnerabilities in their 
AML/CFT legal frameworks.  In October 2007, the FATF issued a 
public statement stating its concern that Iran’s “lack of a 
comprehensive anti-money laundering/combating the financing of 
terrorism (AML/CFT) regime represents a significant vulnerability 
within the international financial system.”102  FATF noted that its 
“members are advising their financial institutions to take the risk 
arising from the deficiencies in Iran’s AML/CFT regime into 
account for enhanced due diligence.”103  Iran thereafter adopted an 
AML law.104  However, the FATF concluded that Iran’s AML/CFT 
 
98 Glaser Statement, supra note 19, at 33. 
99 Financial Action Task Force, http://www.fatf-gafi.org (last visited Mar. 1, 
2009). 
100 See FATF Members & Observers, http://www.fatf-gafi.org (follow 
“About the FATF” hyperlink; then follow “Members & Observers” hyperlink) 
(last visited Mar. 1, 2009) (providing a list of current members and observers of 
FATF). 
101 Glaser Statement, supra note 19, at 32. 
102 Fin. Action Task Force [FATF], FATF Statement on Iran (Oct. 11, 2007), 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/1/2/39481684.pdf. 
103 Id. 
104 Glaser Statement, supra note 19, at 28. 
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regime remained deficient and issued statements of concern about 
Iran in both February 2008 and October 2008.105 
The October 2008 FATF statement noted Iran’s steps towards 
remedying its AML deficiencies, and urged Iran to “address the 
remaining weaknesses.”  In this October 2008 statement, the FATF 
expressed particular concern that Iran’s “lack . . . of effort” to 
“address the risk of terrorist financing continues to pose a serious 
threat to the integrity of the international financial system” and 
declared that “[u]rgent action to address this vulnerability is 
necessary.”106  The FATF called on its members, and urged all 
jurisdictions, to “strengthen preventive measures to protect their 
financial sectors from this risk.”107  In response to these warnings, 
many major economic powers have warned their financial 
institutions that choosing to do business with Iran entails 
significant risks.108 
FATF is also playing a role in promoting effective 
implementation of the financial measures contained in Security 
Council resolutions targeting Iran.  For example, the FATF issued 
guidance in June 2007,109 September 2007,110 and October 2007111 on 
implementation of these measures.  This FATF work was 
recognized in Security Council Resolution 1803, which welcomed 
the guidance issued by FATF to assist states in implementing the 
obligations created by these provisions.112 
 
105 FATF, FATF Statement (Feb. 28, 2008), http://www.fatf-gafi.org 
/dataoecd/16/26/40181037.pdf; FATF, FATF Statement (Oct. 16, 2008), 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/25/17/41508956.pdf. 
106 FATF Statement (Oct. 16, 2008), supra note 105. 
107 Id. 
108 Glaser Statement, supra note 19, at 32. 
109 FATF, Guidance Regarding the Implementation of Financial Provisions of 
United Nations Security Council Resolutions to Counter the Proliferation of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (June 29, 2007), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd 
/28/62/38902632.pdf.  This June 2007 guidance addressed not only the financial 
measures contained in Resolutions 1737 and 1747 regarding Iran but also the 
financial measures contained in Resolutions 1695 and 1718 regarding North 
Korea’s WMD and missile programs. 
110 FATF, Annex: Financial Sanctions Against a Financial Institution 
Designated Under United Nations Security Council Resolutions Relating to 
Prevention of WMD Proliferation (Sept. 5, 2007), http://www.fatf-gafi.org 
/dataoecd/23/16/39318680.pdf. 
111 FATF, Guidance Regarding the Implementation of Activity-Based 
Financial Prohibitions of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737 (Oct. 
12, 2007), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/43/17/39494050.pdf. 
112 S.C. Res. 1803, supra note 83, ¶ 2. 
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4.3. Outreach to Key Foreign Financial Institutions 
From 2006 to the end of the Bush Administration, senior 
Treasury Department officials engaged in an unprecedented 
initiative of outreach to the international financial private sector, 
“meeting with more than 40 banks worldwide to discuss the threat 
Iran poses to the international financial system.”113  Through this 
initiative, Treasury “shared information about Iran’s deceptive 
financial behavior and raised awareness about the high financial 
and reputational risk associated with doing business with Iran.”114  
In response to this campaign, more than 80 banks around the 
world, including “most of the world’s top financial institutions,”115 
have curtailed business with Iran.116  Some leading financial 
institutions have dramatically scaled back their Iran-related 
business, while others have halted it entirely.117 
Many financial institutions have responded to Treasury’s 
outreach by cutting off Iranian business in dollars but not other 
currencies.118  Some of Treasury’s financial measures against Iran 
may thus contribute to undermining the dollar’s preeminence in 
global financial markets, thereby rendering such measures less 
impactful in the future.119  This is a significant concern, and strong 
consideration should be given as to how to design future financial 
sanctions to minimize their risk to the dollar’s primacy.  However, 
with Iran speeding towards nuclear weapons capability—a gravely 
dangerous prospect—and Treasury’s financial measures 
apparently the most effective existing peaceful means of increasing 
U.S. leverage over Iran, deploying these measures now is likely 
worth the risk. 
Treasury officials attribute the success of their outreach efforts 
to their emphasis on Iran being “demonstrably engaged” in illicit 
financial conduct and the sensitivity of the international financial 
 
113 Glaser Statement, supra note 19, at 34. 
114 Id. 
115 Paulson Remarks, supra note 25. 
116 See Wright, supra note 28, at 31 (noting that over eighty banks have ceased 
doing business with Iran). 
117 Glaser Statement, supra note 19, at 34. 
118 Id. 
119 As Bush Administration Treasury Secretary Paulson stated, “Treasury can 
effectively use these tools largely because the U.S. is the key hub of the global 
financial system” and that “maintaining this standing . . . makes our strategy 
possible.”  Paulson Remarks, supra note 25. 
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private sector to reputational and business risk.120  In its outreach 
to foreign governments and international private financial 
institutions, Treasury has tried to emphasize that the issue is not 
just “conduct that the U.S. doesn’t like politically, but conduct 
that’s contrary to international law or international standards and 
norms.”121 
Treasury officials have also raised the prospect of business and 
reputational risks posed by doing business with Iran.  For example, 
Bush Administration Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson 
cautioned business executives that in light of Iran’s deceptive 
financial practices, including its use of front companies, and since 
“[t]he IRGC is so deeply entrenched in Iran’s economy and 
commercial enterprises, it is increasingly likely that if you are 
doing business with Iran, you are somehow doing business with 
the IRGC.”122  For international private financial institutions, this is 
reputationally daunting given the IRGC’s leading role in Iran’s 
terrorism and proliferation activities,123 and legally daunting in 
light of the Treasury Department’s designation of the IRGC under 
Executive Order 13382 and the Security Council’s inclusion of three 
designated IRGC entities and nine designated IRGC senior officials 
on the list of designees with respect to which all states must freeze 
assets and “ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic 
resources are prevented from being made available by their 
nationals or by any persons or entities within their territories, to or 
for the benefit of these persons and entities.”124 
Stuart Levey, the Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial 
Intelligence under President Bush and now President Obama, has 
also addressed the issue of reputational and business risk.  Levy 
notes that “[f]inancial institutions want to identify and avoid 
dangerous or risky customers who could harm their reputations 
 
120 See Glaser Statement, supra note 19, at 34–35 (explaining the importance of 
involving the private sector in aiding the enforcement of sanctions against 
countries engaged in illicit conduct). 
121 Fang, supra note 42, at C2. (quoting Adam Szubin, director of Treasury’s 
Office of Foreign Assets Control). 
122 Paulson Remarks, supra note 25. 
123 Bush Administration Treasury Secretary Paulson accused the IRGC of 
being “directly involved in the planning and support of terrorist acts.”  Id. 
124 S.C. Res. 1737, supra note 81, ¶ 12; see also S.C. Res. 1747, supra note 82, ¶ 4, 
Annex I (reaffirming and applying the measure stated in S.C. Res. 1737, ¶ 12 to 
the persons and entities in Annex I). 
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and business.”125  Treasury Deputy Assistant Secretary Daniel 
Glaser concurs, stating that “[r]ather than comply with just the 
letter of the law, we have seen many in the banking industry 
voluntarily go beyond their legal requirements because they do not 
want to handle illicit business.”126  Many banks around the world 
now screen their customers against Treasury’s list of designees, 
even when they are not required to do so by the laws of the 
country in which the bank is domiciled.127  So cognizant are major 
U.S. and foreign banks of the risks posed to them by the infiltration 
of illicit money, that all of them now have offices dedicated to 
protecting against such infiltration.128  Treasury’s designations 
advise these offices of “who they need to protect against.”129 
Although Treasury officials tend to downplay it, international 
private financial institutions have also likely halted Iran-related 
business in response to Treasury’s outreach because those 
institutions are concerned that continuation of Iran-related 
business could result in regulatory penalties such as fines or even 
loss of access to the U.S. market.  The size of the U.S. market, the 
primacy of the dollar and of U.S. banks in the international 
financial system, and the powerful impact on Banco Delta Asia 
from Treasury’s mere threat to cut if off from the U.S. financial 
system130 would presumably make many banks leery of putting 
their access to the U.S. banking system at risk for the sake of 
maintaining financial ties to terrorists or proliferators. 
Periodic large fines have also sent a message to international 
private financial institutions that there is a price to be paid for 
being caught doing business with entities and individuals 
designated as having links to terrorism and proliferation.  For 
example, in May 2004 the Federal Reserve fined UBS, Switzerland’s 
largest bank, $100 million for sending U.S. dollars to Cuba, Iran, 
Libya and Yugoslavia and intentionally hiding the transactions by 
 
125  Minimizing Potential Threats from Iran: Assessing the Effectiveness of Current 
US Sanctions on Iran: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and 
Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Stuart Levey, Under Secretary for 
Terrorism and Financial Intelligence), available at http://banking.senate.gov 
/public/_files/ACF44E2.pdf. 
126 Glaser Statement, supra note 19, at 35. 
127 Paulson Remarks, supra note 25. 
128 See id. (discussing the methods taken by reputable banks because they do 
not want to be associated with terrorists and proliferators). 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
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filing false monthly reports to the Federal Reserve.131  In December 
2005, ABN Amro Bank NV, a Dutch firm, was fined $80 million by 
U.S. federal and state financial regulators for actions including 
modification by its branch in Dubai of payment instructions on 
wire transfers, letters of credit and checks issued by Iran’s Bank 
Melli and a Libyan bank in order to hide their involvement in the 
transactions and enable access to the U.S. banking system.132  As 
one former Treasury official put it, the Treasury Department’s 
success in persuading foreign banks to curtail transactions with 
Iran is due in part to those banks’ eagerness “to avoid being the 
‘next ABN AMRO.’”133 
Most recently, in January 2009, Lloyds TSB Bank had to pay 
$350 million in fines and forfeiture as a result of a scheme in which 
Lloyds altered or “stripped” wire-transfer information to hide the 
identities of Iranian and Sudanese clients in order to deceive 
American financial institutions and enable the clients to access the 
U.S. banking system.134  The stripping of wire-transfer information 
“made it appear that the transactions originated at Lloyds TSB 
Bank” in the United Kingdom rather than in the sanctioned 
countries.135  Screening mechanisms at U.S. banks would have 
raised an alarm if the actual source of the funds had been evident, 
but coming from a respected British bank, the transfers were not 
questioned.136  In some cases, the transferred funds “appear to have 
purchased items within” the United States.137  In others, the funds 
were being channeled through U.S. banks to foreign vendors 
 
131 UBS Fined $100 Million Over Trading of Dollars, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2004, at 
C17. 
132 Paul Blustein, Dutch Bank Fined for Iran, Libya Transactions: $80 Million 
Levied for Foreign Dealings, Money Laundering, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 2005, at D1.  
Treasury stated: “Between December 2001 and April 2004, ABN AMRO’s overseas 
branches removed or revised references to entities in which the Governments of 
Libya and Iran had an interest before forwarding wire transfers, letters of credit 
and U.S. dollar checks to ABN AMRO branches in New York, NY and Chicago, 
IL.”  OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. DEP’T. TREASURY, ENFORCEMENT 
INFORMATION FOR JANUARY 3, 2006 (Jan. 3, 2006), available at http://www.treas.gov 
/offices/enforcement/ofac/civpen/penalties/01032006.pdf. 
133 Jacobson, supra note 39, at 73. 
134 Chad Bray, Lloyds TSB Settles with U.S. Officials, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 2009, at 
B8. 
135 Id. 
136 Tehran’s Strip Club: How Lloyds Bank Helped Iran’s Global Shopping Spree, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2009, at A12. 
137 Id. 
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requesting payment in dollars.138  Lloyds admits to “stripping” 
with respect to Iranian clients until 2004.139  As of the writing of 
this article in January 2009, it was unclear whether Treasury’s 
invigoration of Iran financial sanctions beginning in 2005 played 
any role in causing Lloyds to refrain from restarting the wire-
transfer information stripping it halted in 2004. 
Whatever their motivations, once some international private 
financial institutions decide to halt business with entities or 
individuals of concern, “it becomes an even greater reputational 
risk for others not to follow, and so they often do.”140  Such 
voluntary private decisions in turn make it “even more palatable 
for foreign governments to impose similar measures because their 
financial institutions have already given up the business, thus 
creating a mutually-reinforcing cycle of public and private 
action.”141 
Treasury’s financial measures are also seen as more palatable 
because unlike sanctions of the past that targeted entire countries 
and were criticized as harming innocent people, Treasury’s 
measures are perceived as more targeted.142  In addition, Treasury 
has imposed these financial sanctions in a graduated manner, 
providing Iranian entities and individuals with “numerous 
opportunities to alter their behavior before further measures are 
imposed.”143  This has helped build international support for the 
sanctions by demonstrating that “the purpose of such measures is 
not simply to punish the Iranian regime, but also to encourage a 
change in behavior.”144 
5. CONCLUSION 
Treasury’s conduct-based, intelligence-grounded, targeted 
financial sanctions have thus far proven to be among the twenty-
first century’s most effective and important new counterterrorism 
and counterproliferation tools.  The imposition of such sanctions 
on Iran has resulted in more than eighty banks around the world, 
 
138 Id. 
139 Bray, supra note 134. 
140 Paulson Remarks, supra note 25. 
141 Glaser Statement, supra note 19, at 35. 
142 Fang, supra note 42, at C1. 
143 Jacobson, supra note 39, at 74. 
144 Id. 
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including most of the world’s top financial institutions, curtailing 
business with Iran; has disrupted key Iranian trading relationships; 
and has decreased Iran’s ability to finance vital petroleum 
development projects.  As a result, in November 2008, sixty leading 
Iranian economists called in an open letter for the regime to 
drastically change course, saying that Iran’s “‘tension-creating’ 
foreign policy has ‘scared off foreign investment’"145 and cost the 
Iranian economy “many billions of dollars.”146  
The Treasury Department’s financial sanctions strategy against 
Iran includes several innovations that seem highly likely to impact 
the design of future sanctions against other targets.  These include 
direct outreach to individual foreign private financial institutions, 
the aggressive use of financial authorities to pursue political goals, 
and the effective development and harnessing of intelligence about 
global financial transactions. 
Treasury’s outreach to individual foreign private financial 
institutions has persuaded many—including most of the world’s 
top financial institutions—to take steps against Iran that go beyond 
what is required of them by their home countries’ laws.  Treasury 
has found that its unprecedented direct outreach to a country’s key 
private financial institutions can yield results much more quickly 
than does outreach to that same country’s government, which can 
lack political will or the necessary authority, or may face 
cumbersome bureaucratic procedures for exercising whatever 
relevant authorities it does have.  Once some foreign private 
financial institutions decide to halt business with entities or 
individuals of concern, the reputational risk for others not to 
follow is increased, and so they often do follow.  Such private 
sector decisions can in turn make it more politically feasible for 
foreign governments to impose restrictions because the relevant 
companies in their jurisdiction have already given up the business.  
Globalization has inevitably increased the business interests in the 
United States of many leading foreign companies, leaving them 
subject to U.S. government regulation and leverage, and reliant on 
the good will of the U.S. government and consumers.  As a result, 
major foreign companies in sectors beyond finance may also be 
susceptible to direct outreach by the U.S. government. 
 
 145 Daragahi, supra note 37. 
 146 Sixty Iranian Economists Write Open Letter to President, BBC WORLDWIDE 
MONITORING, Nov. 14, 2008, at 3. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss3/3
 
2009]    TREASURY’S INNOVATIVE FINANCIAL SANCTIONS 821 
Another of the financial sanctions strategy’s innovations is the 
U.S. Treasury Department’s newfound willingness to use its 
financial authorities to pursue political goals.  Because global 
financial flows are increasing rapidly and already exceed the 
worldwide trade in goods and services, Treasury’s willingness to 
use its financial muscle to pursue political goals is going to become 
increasingly important.  This financial muscle seems likely to be 
applied to additional targets.  It will likely also be applied in new 
ways, as experience, creativity and changes in the financial markets 
and regulatory regimes lead Treasury to enhance and refine the 
initial set of financial sanctions tools discussed in this article. 
A third innovative element of the financial sanctions has been 
Treasury’s exceptionally effective development and use of 
intelligence about global financial transactions.  The availability of 
such intelligence has been enhanced by the advance of technology, 
the increasing integration born of globalization, and most 
governments’ more rigorous regulation of financial transactions as 
a result of U.S. advocacy at FATF and the U.N. following the 
September 11 attacks.  Technological advances (including the 
internet and mobile telecommunications) and increasing 
integration have likely increased the potential transparency of 
other transnational activities, such as travel and communications.  
It may be tempting for the U.S. government to enhance its 
harnessing of intelligence from such activities. 
  The Obama Administration may decide to try to replicate in 
other sectors the innovative willingness to use financial sector 
economic and regulatory muscle to pursue political goals and the 
Treasury Department’s novel tactic of direct outreach to individual 
foreign private financial institutions.  If so, foreign companies in 
exceptionally globalized, strategic, regulated, and information-rich 
sectors such as mobile telecommunications, the Internet, aviation, 
and energy could be next in line.  Before the Obama 
Administration takes such steps, however, it should analyze and 
weigh very carefully both the risk posed by such measures to U.S. 
economic and regulatory preeminence in those sectors and the risk 
that such steps might set problematic precedents that could be 
used against the United States by current or future adversaries.147  
 
 147 For example, the United States depends heavily on Chinese purchases of 
American debt, a dependence which provides China with significant leverage 
over the United States.  See, e.g., Keith Bradsher, China Losing Taste for Debt From 
the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2009, at A1. 
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Any such moves into additional sectors should be designed with 
an eye to minimizing those risks. 
In the meantime, there is considerable potential for the 
application of Treasury’s initial set of financial sanctions tools to 
additional security challenges and to greater worldwide effect.  In 
order for this potential to be achieved, many more nations must (1) 
adequately outlaw terrorist and proliferation finance and money 
laundering, and (2) implement laws giving their finance ministries 
the authority to effectively access and use intelligence and quickly 
impose sanctions against the financing of terrorism and 
proliferation.  Several key U.S. allies have yet to adequately outlaw 
money laundering and terrorist finance, and even more countries 
have yet to develop the authorities and capabilities necessary to 
apply targeted financial measures to any terrorist group other than 
Al Qaeda and the Taliban.148  In addition, and in order to ensure 
that such financial sanctions do not lead to a counterproductive 
undermining of the dollar’s primacy in international financial 
transactions, the managers of the leading alternative currency, the 
Euro, must become full partners in imposing sanctions against 
financiers of terrorism and proliferation. 
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